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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent : 
v. : 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, : Case No. 21027 
Category No, 1 
Defendant-Appellant : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of Issues, Statement of Case, and Summary of 
Argument are set forth in Appellant's opening brief. Mr. Gardner 
takes this opportunity to reply to Points I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, 
X, XI, XII, XIV, XVI and XVII of Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MR. GARDNER'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
The State claims that the mere dissemination of news 
thought to be prejudicial to a defendant does not normally entitle 
him to prevail on a motion for a change of venue and argues that Mr. 
Gardner made only a bare allegation of prejudice, which is patently 
inadequate to justify a change of venue. The State relies on State 
v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981) for the statement, "(t)he mere 
demonstration that some dissemination of news thought to be 
prejudicial to a defendant has occurred does not normally entitle 
him to prevail on a motion for change of venue." Wood is 
distinguishable from the present case in that Wood's motion for a 
change of venue was supported only by defense counsel's affidavit to 
which was attached a single newspaper article reporting the 
gratitude of the victim's father for the manner in which his family 
had been taken care of by local authorities and giving a short 
account of the crime. 
The State relies on State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 
1977), and asks the Court to reach the same conclusion that "this is 
not one of those exceptional cases where pretrial publicity 
exacerbated by State complicity encouraged the jurors to form such 
strong preconceived views of defendant's guilt as to be considered 
inherently prejudicial against him." (Respondent's Brief at 15). 
In State v. Pierre, supra, the trial had already been moved from 
Weber to Davis County as the result of a previous motion for change 
of venue. In his second motion for change of venue, the defendant 
contended that Salt Lake County was the only county where he could 
receive a fair trial. Unlike Pierre, the media coverage of Gardner 
occurred almost immediately after the courthouse shooting with 
detailed news reports and photos showing Gardner at the crime scene 
in a blood-soaked shirt, sitting on the lawn surrounded by lawmen as 
reporters detailed the events that had just transpired. 
Furthermore, as jurors recalled, there were shots of the victims 
being loaded into ambulances and reports of Gardner's prior criminal 
convictions. 
In addition, as asserted in Appellant's opening brief at 
22-26, news reports were biased in that they repeatedly referred to 
Mr. Gardner as a violent man who committed a prior murder and made 
repeated escape attempts, and who required extensive security. The 
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media went beyond trying Mr. Gardner; it simply assumed his guilt. 
(See Appellant's Opening Brief at 22-9 and Addendum F and Addendum G 
in Appellant's Brief). And, in addition to the abuse by state 
officials asserted by Mr. Gardner in his opening brief at 25-27, 
Sheriff Hayward committed perhaps the most flagrant abuse when he 
made his comment that Mr. Gardner was a dangerous man against whom 
deadly force should have been used and that prison guards should 
have shot him until he was down and dead. Salt Lake Tribune 
(Trib.), April 9, 1985, Exhibit D-7; Deseret News, April 10, 1985, 
Exhibit D-7, See Addendum F, Appellant's Opening Brief. The 
exposure of potential jurors who ultimately would decide whether Mr. 
Gardner should be given a life or death sentence to "official" 
comments of this nature contrasts sharply with the circumstances in 
Pierre. 
The State argues that only the Dan Jones' poll was used to 
show community prejudice and none of the jurors' statements were 
used to support the argument (Brief of Respondent at 16-17). On the 
contrary, Mr. Gardner asserts in his opening brief at 30-31 
11
 (iinspection of the jury voir dire reveals that a significant 
segment of the potential jurors were admittedly prejudiced against 
Mr. Gardner." The first motion was made and decided at the pretrial 
stage before the venire was seated. At that stage,the only possible 
evidence of potential prejudice which could be presented were the 
news articles and opinion poll. Until the jury venire was 
questioned, evidence of the prejudicial effect of the publicity on 
the potential jurors did not exist. 
This court should find that the opinion poll is a valid 
evaluation of community prejudice. The respondent has stated that 
the Dan Jones' opinion poll "leaps to the conclusion" that the 
Gardner jury must have been prejudiced and is nothing more than a 
bare allegation of prejudice. For support, the state again cites 
Wood and State v. Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969), neither of 
which sets a standard for measuring what is an acceptable allegation 
of prejudice nor deals with a public opinion poll, but only state 
what is not an adequate allegation of prejudice. As such, the Court 
should consider the standard set forth in Maine v. Superior Court of 
Mendocino County, 438 P.2d 372 (California 1968) which provides: 
A motion for change of venue or continuance shall 
be granted whenever it is determined that because 
of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial 
material, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
in the absence of such relief, a fair trial 
cannot be had. This determination may be based 
on such evidence as qualified public opinion 
surveys or opinion testimony offered by 
individuals, or on the court's own evaluation of 
the nature, frequency, and timing of the material 
involved. 
Id. at 377 citing "Standards for Granting the Motion" from The 
Reardon Report, an American Bar Association Project on Minimum 
Standards for Criminal Justice. In any event, the nexus between 
community prejudice and jury prejudice should be grounds for 
granting a motion for change of venue. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 
6 L.Ed.2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (1961). 
In addition, once the potential jury was voir dired, the 
courtfs error in failing to grant the motion for change of venue was 
clarified by juror responses. All twelve of the jurors who served 
in the Gardner trial were familiar with the facts of the case; many 
recalled detailed events and vivid images of the crime as it was 
reported either on television, radio, or in the newspapers. 
Furthermore, eight of the jurors, prior to their rehabilitation, 
made statements reflecting that they had a predisposed opinion as to 
_ 4 _ 
Mr. Gardner's guilt, were subjected to the opinions of their peers 
regarding Mr. Gardner's guilt, or did not feel comfortable being on 
the Gardner jury.1 Three of the jurors were not rehabilitated after 
1
* Mrs. Whitelock (R. 1501-1513) recalled seeing Mr. Gardner 
sitting on the courthouse lawn and having an initial reaction of 
"Well, at least he got hurt, too." (R. 1508). 
Mr. Miller (R. 1540-1551) during his voirdire expressed his 
initial reaction: 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: Do you recall your reaction to that 
image? Did you have a reaction at all? 
Mr. Miller: Well, as it came out earlier, I had formed an 
opinion. I felt that it was Mr. Gardner at that time. 
Mr. Andrew Valdez: That he was guilty? 
Mr. Miller: Yes, that he had fired the shots. 
(R. 1545-1546). Mr. Miller had also discussed the incident with 
various peers, some of whom had expressed an opinion that Mr. 
Gardner should be executed. 
Mr.Jones (R. 1551-1558) said his understanding of the case 
was that the defense only wanted to save Gardner's life, "that they 
figured he was guilty." (R. 1552). He was never rehabilitated on 
this point. 
Mr. Dansie (R. 1578-1591) had knowledge of much of Mr. 
Gardner's prior criminal activity. He noted the hospital escape, 
the Cheers Tavern shooting, and a note he believed Mr. Gardner had 
left after the commission of a crime. He was also very familiar 
with the facts of the courthouse killing, specifically remembering a 
story he had read regarding the victim, Mr. Burdell, and that he had 
discussed this with his wife. He stated during his voir dire, "[I] 
would assume from reading the paper that he actually did shoot that 
lawyer, yes. I think he shot the lawyer." (R. 1585). Further, he 
stated, "As far as Mr. Gardner goes, I don't know the circumstances, 
how it come about or anything, why he killed him or what the deal 
was. I assume it was an escape." The court did not grant the 
defense's challenge of Mr. Dansie. 
Mr. Nicholl (R. 1729-1740) said the main thing he 
remembered regarding Gardner was "the television constantly showing 
the footage of Mr. Gardner on the gurney with blood all over his 
shirt." (R. 1729-1730). Further, Mr.Nicholl had discussed the case 
with his wife and later with his father who had stated that he 
believed Gardner was probably guilty. 
Mrs. Halander (R. 1757-1767) said she believed being on the 
Gardner jury was kind of scary, "kind of astonishing." (R. 
1764-1765). 
Mr. Borton (R. 1822-1834) made the statement that his 
initial reaction was "[H]e did it, I guess. He was there on TV and 
they had had handcuffs on him, so I assume that he was the one who 
did it." (R. 1831) . 
Mrs. Davies (R. 1432-1442) had discussed the case with a 
co-employee who had formed the opinion that Mr. Gardner was guilty. 
See also: Mrs. Cline (R. 1676-1687); Mrs. Brewer (R. 
1702-1711); Mrs. Barrett (R. 1356-1360); Mrs. Hansen (R. 
1417-1424). 
making prejudicial statements or giving a recall of the facts to see 
if they could set aside their opinions or what they already knew of 
the case.2 
The logic of Ruiz v. State, 582 S.W.2d 915 (Ark. 1979), 
applies in this case. The Ruiz court found that where 10 of 12 
jurors had been subjected to extensive media coverage giving 
saturation point coverage to the alleged crimes, even though jurors 
believed they were being honest when they stated they thought they 
could give the appellants a fair and impartial trial "it would be 
almost impossible for any person to completely remove these 
materials from his mind while serving as a juror in this case." Id. 
at 923. 
In addition to the final twelve jurors, many of the 
venirepersons made prejudicial statements during the individual and 
group voir dire indicating that they also had a predisposed opinion 
to Mr. Gardner's guilt, had been subjected to the opinions of their 
peers, or would not feel comfortable being on the Gardner jury, all 
influences that may be hard for a juror to set aside. 
Of the 80 venirepersons three were dismissed prior to the 
group voir dire. During the group voir dire 50 of the remaining 77 
venirepersons said that they had discussed the case either with 
family, friends or acquaintances. 
Furthermore, of the remaining 77, 45 venirepersons said 
that prior to jury duty they had formed an opinion as to the guilt 
or innocence of Mr. Gardner, and of these 24 said they would have a 
2
- Mr. Jones, (R. 1551-1558); Mr. Dansie, (R. 1578-1581); and 
Mrs. Brewer, (R. 1702-1711). 
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difficult time setting aside their pre-established opinions. Most 
of these were of the 21 dismissed for cause prior to the individual 
voir dire. However, of the remaining 57 venirepersons many (24) made 
statements reflecting that they had opinions or had been subjected 
to opinions that would be difficult to set aside. All but one were 
familiar with the facts. See Addendum A. 
The jurors1 knowledge of the case, coupled with the Dan 
Jones1 poll in which the vast majority of voters in Salt Lake County 
were calculated to have heard, seen, or read of the case and, 
furthermore, that 90% had formed the opinion that Mr. Gardner was 
guilty and three-quarters believed he should be sentenced to death 
supports the claim that it was impossible to seat an impartial jury 
in Salt Lake County. The language in Ruiz is again appropriate: 
The material presented during the hearing on the 
motion for a change of venue and during the voir 
dire examination revealed that there were wide 
spread beliefs in the community that the 
appellants were guilty before the trial actually 
started. There seems to be a pattern of ill 
feeling toward the appellants in the community 
and under these circumstances we believe bias or 
prejudice may be presumed. Although the exact 
question was not put, no juror stated that he was 
100% sure that he could lay aside his previous 
impressions or opinions. 
Id. at 923. 
The present case is also similar to Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S.717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), which held that there 
was a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice shown to be present 
throughout the community, which was clearly reflected in the sum 
total of the voir dire examination of the jurors, that a fair trial 
was not had. 
- 7 -
The state also argues that the transfer from the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice to the City and County 
Building—located across the street from one another—should not be 
grounds for a change of venue as "jurors often request to view the 
scene of the crime during a trial so they can better understand the 
evidence." (Respondent's Brief at 18). Therefore, the state 
appears to argue, the proximity of the trial to the scene of the 
crime would not necessarily make the location of the trial 
prejudicial to the defendant as it would be of benefit to jurors to 
have the locale of the crime nearby. 
Juror visitations to the scene of a crime have always been 
done under controlled circumstances and jurors have not been allowed 
to be in a position where they are free to roam the scene of the 
crime as it may conjure up prejudicial images. Juror misconduct 
occurs where a juror conducts an independent investigation. Walker 
v. Holiday Lanes, 413 P.2d 63 (Kansas 1966). And as stated in State 
v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (Utah 1971): 
If the efficacy of the jury system is to be 
preserved the courts cannot permit individual 
jurors to make private and individual 
investigations of the facts of the case they are 
impaneled to decide. We have no way of 
determining whether or not the conduct of the 
juror influenced his judgment in arriving at a 
verdict. 
Id. at 787. 
And while the record does not establish that any jurors 
visited the scene of the crime, even the respondent's brief supports 
the argument that the temptation to investigate the scene of the 
crime may have been too great as a juror could easily walk to the 
scene during a recess or as they went by the Municipal Building on 
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their way to and from the City and County Building, Additionally, 
the very presence of the scene of the crime within close proximity 
to the trial may have been enough to unduly influence a juror with 
his verdict, a factor the court has no way of determining. Utah, 
then, should adopt the logic of Ruiz when the court granted a change 
of venue to another county: 
The site of the trial could have been changed to 
any courthouse in the district [covering three 
counties] and would have been more distant from 
the actual scene of the crime and the center of 
publicity and the resentment which naturally 
built around this case than the site where the 
trial was held. 
Id. at 921. 
Finally, respondent argues "it is unlikely that venue could 
have been transferred to a county which was unfamiliar with this 
case." (Respondent's Brief at 18). As support respondent argues 
that Utah has only three television stations which broadcast 
throughout the entire state as well as areas of Idaho, Wyoming, and 
Nevada, apparently making the assumption that all potential jurors 
in the state of Utah receive all of their news from one of the three 
stations. 
However, in addition to Utah's two PBS stations 
broadcasting statewide—one of which broadcasts its own news program 
concentrating primarily on Utah County news—many of the counties 
bordering Utah's neighbor states also receive out-of-state 
broadcasts. Furthermore, there are a myriad of radio stations 
operating in the state, many of which logically would not have given 
the Gardner incident nearly as much attention as the Salt Lake 
County stations. And, finally, many of the counties in the state 
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have their own daily newspapers which, understandably, would not 
have given the courthouse shooting the sensational publicity it 
received in the Salt Lake papers. 
The record in this case indicates that prejudicial 
publicity regarding Mr, Gardner and the incidents involved in the 
present case was widely disseminated throughout Salt Lake County. 
The actual reports, Dan Jones opinion poll and juror responses 
establish that Mr. Gardner could not receive a fair trial in Salt 
Lake County. The trial judge abused his discretion in failing to 
transfer the case to a county where the courthouse was not in close 
proximity to the scene of the crime and where potential jurors had 
not been inundated which prejudicial publicity. 
POINT II 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECUSAL. 
Both the state and Mr,, Gardner relied on Haslam v. 
Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948) for statements regarding their 
position on the recusal issue. A contextual reading of the 
paragraph from which the sentences quoted by both parties are taken 
supports the idea that in the interest of maintaining the purity and 
integrity of the judicial process, a defendant need not allege 
actual bias, but only the strong appearance of bias to urge a judge 
to recuse himself. 
The general practice in this jurisdiction has 
been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever 
an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them 
has been filed. As a general rule, we think this 
is a commendable practice. The purity and 
integrity of the judicial process ought to be 
protected against any taint of suspicion to the 
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end that the public and litigants may have the 
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness 
of the courts. This is not to say that the mere 
filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice, 
ipso facto casts such suspicion on the judge, and 
upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to 
disqualify himself. However, it is ordinarily 
better for a judge to disqualify himself even 
though he may be entirely free of bias and 
prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit 
of bias and prejudice. "Next in importance to 
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is 
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget 
no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the 
judge." 
Id. at 523-24 citing Crook v. Newborg & Son, 124 Ala. 479, 27 So. 
432, 433, 82 Am.St. Rep. 190; 30 Am.Jur. 767, Judges, Sec. 53. 
Further, the states makes an effort to distinguish the 
cases relied upon by Mr. Gardner, Anderson v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985); Wilkett v. State, 674 P.2d 573 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984); People v. District Court in and for Third 
Judicial District, 192 Colo. 503, 560 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1911); 
Potashnich v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) 
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); and United States v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974) for the 
purpose of showing that the circumstances of these cases differ from 
the present case in instances where a motion for recusal was granted 
on an allegation of the appearance of bias or prejudice alone. 
However, in recanting a general summary of the facts of the above 
cases, while the state has shown that the circumstances of each case 
are distinct, they have also shown that the courts in a number of 
instances, in an effort to maintain their integrity and remove 
themselves from even the most remote possibility of prejudice or 
bias, have recused themselves from a case even if no actual 
prejudice is shown, but only an appearance of prejudice. 
The state also relies on State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723 
(Utah 1948)(overruled on other grounds in First Federal Savings and 
Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P„2d 1257, 1263 (Utah 1984)) for the 
holding that a defendant must establish actual bias and prejudice in 
making a motion for recusal. However, it should be noted that the 
Byington court cited the paragraph quoted above in this reply, in 
full, saying "it should suggest to trial judges what this court 
believes to be the better practice when an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice is filed in good faith." Id. at 726. 
The State further asserts that "(a)lthough Judge Banks 
ruled on evidentiary matters, defendant fails to cite any incidents 
where Judge Banks made an erroneous ruling based upon bias." 
Respondent's Brief at 22. A review of Appellant's opening brief 
establishes that Appellant contends Judge Banks made a number of 
erroneous rulings in this case. 
The State has misapprehended the case law regarding motions 
to recuse. Further, by its own response, the state has supported the 
argument that the mere appearance of prejudice or bias is enough to 
grant a motion for recusal. 
POINT III 
(Reply to Respondent's Point III) 
THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS APPLIED BECAUSE THE USE OF THE SAME 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN BOTH THE GUILT 
AND PENALTY PHASES SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND FAILS TO NARROW THE CLASS 
OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
The State relies on Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815 
(Utah 1980) to support its contention that the burden of proof is 
not shifted to the defendant in the penalty phase of capital 
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homicide cases. While Justice Hall did reach that conclusion in his 
written opinion, that opinion was joined by only one justice. Thus, 
Pierre's written opinion represents the views of a plurality, not a 
majority. Justice Stewart, who concurred in the result in Pierre, 
expressed different reasoning in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 273 
(Stewart, J., concurring)(Utah 1980), where he said: 
In the penalty phase, after guilt has been 
proved, the jury is necessarily aware that it has 
found an aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the prosecution, in arguing 
for imposition of the death penalty, will 
undoubtedly dwell upon that fact. If the jury 
may impose death merely by finding that 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances (a preponderance of evidence test) 
a death penalty is virtually assured. 
607 P.2d at 273-274. 
Mr. Gardner asks this Court to turn away from the plurality 
opinion in Pierre and instead find that Utah law unacceptably shifts 
the burden from the prosecution to the defendant. 
The State also contends that Utah's capital sentencing 
procedure falls outside the holding of Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 
258 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S.C. 546 (1985) by attempting 
to limit the Collins rationale to cases involving felony-murder 
capital homicide convictions. While the state correctly perceives a 
distinction between some felony murder convictions and other types 
of first degree murder convictions, that distinction is irrelevant 
here. The crime in Collins was robbery-murder. The Court there 
found the death penalty to be unconstitutionally applied because the 
aggravating circumstance, murder for pecuniary gain, merely repeated 
an element of the offense of murder in the course of a robbery. Id. 
at 264. The Court said the aggravating circumstances failed to 
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fulfill the designated narrowing function because the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance did not distinguish some robber-murderers 
from others. Id. In the same way, the Utah statute does not 
distinguish among those murder-escapees (or persons or crimes 
fitting into the other aggravating circumstances) convicted of First 
Degree Murder who should be subject to the death penalty. 
The State correctly notes that not all circuits have chosen 
to follow the rationale, Adams v. Wainwright, 709F.2d 1443 (11th 
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); Gray v. Lucan, 677 
F.2d 1086, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 910 
(1983). 
This dispute between circuits will now be settled by the 
U.S. Supreme Court which has agreed to hear Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 817 
F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987). Phelps is a 1987 Fifth Circuit case which 
addresses the question of whether aggravating circumstances which 
repeat an element of the underlying crime fail to narrow the class 
of offenders eligible for the death penalty. 
In addition, the Eighth Circuit has reaffirmed its 
commitment to Collins. Woodard v. Sargent, 806 F.2d 153, 156 (8th 
Cir., 1986); Singleton v. Lockhart, 653 F.Supp. 1114, 1135 (Ark. 
1986). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has also chosen to follow the 
Collins rationale. McClellan v.Kentucky, 715 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1986). 
Mr. Gardner asks the Utah Court to follow the reasoning in 
Collins and find that the Utah statute unconstitutionally fails to 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. 
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POINT VI 
(Reply to Respondent's Point VI) 
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CHARGED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-202(1)(h) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS IT ALLOWS PRESENTATION OF PREJUDICIAL 
INFORMATION TO THE JURY DENYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
The State charged Mr. Gardner under Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-202(1)(h), citing two prior robbery convictions: February 22, 
1980, and September 17, 1981 and evidence of such prior convictions 
was presented to the jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the 
trial. Subsection (h) of the Utah Code Ann.§76-5-202(1) is 
unconstitutional, and its use in the trial of Mr. Gardner prejudiced 
the jury against him denying him due process and preventing him from 
receiving a fair trial by an impartial jury pursuant to the 
protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution.3 
The state acknowledges that even where an argument is not 
made at trial that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, 
this Court on direct appeal in a capital case, will review the 
record for "manifest and prejudicial" error. State v. Norton, 675 
P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983)(citing State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 
(Utah 1982)) . 
3« This issue is currently before the Court in State v. Menzies, 
Case No. 87011, an interlocutory appeal brought by the State after 
Judge Raymond Uno of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah ruled that subsection (h) of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-202(1) is unconstitutional. 
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Allowing evidence of prior convictions to reach the jury 
during the guilt/innocence phase is unconstitutional for two related 
reasons: (1) such evidence prejudices the jury against the accused 
as jurors are more likely to convict because the accused is a bad 
person rather than on the evidence presented relating to the 
specific crime, and (2) such evidence of prior convictions has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the factual circumstances of the 
murder. Whether a homicide was committed under circumstances which 
elevate it to a capital homicide should be decided based on the 
facts of the murder itself; evidence of prior convictions should be 
considered only in determining the proper penalty. 
Utah's legislature and this Court have recognized the 
prejudicial impact of prior convictions reaching the jury during the 
guilt phase of a trial, and mandated a bifurcated trial or severance 
in situations where evidence of prior crimes is necessary to support 
a charge (See Appellant's Brief at 59-63.) In addition, Utah has 
adopted the federal rules of evidence, including Rules 404 and 609, 
which recognize the prejudicial impact of introducing prior 
convictions as evidence at the guilt phase of a trial. 
Subsection (h) is distinct from the other aggravating 
circumstances contained in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1) in that the 
prior conviction has no factual relationship to the events of the 
homicide.^ The focus in the guilt/innocence phase of a capital 
homicide trial should be on whether the accused committed the 
4
* Only subsection (p) (the actor was under a sentence of life 
imprisonment or a sentence of death at the time of the commission of 
the homicide) is similar to (h) in that it focuses on the 
defendant's prior crimes, rather than the specific activity involved 
in the crime currently charged. 
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homicide and, if so, the manner in which he carried out the murder. 
Instead of focusing on the actual homicide, subsection (h) focuses 
on the status of the accused as a previously convicted felon. Such 
status is irrelevant in determining whether a homicide was committed 
in a manner justifying treatment as a capital murder. 
"A concomitant of the presumption of innocence" is that 
"[i]t is fundamental to American jurisprudence that a defendant must 
be tried for what he did not for who he is." United States v. 
Foskey, 636 P.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. 
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)). On this issue the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has added: 
The accused is not only presumed to be innocent 
of the crime with which he is charged, but our 
legal tradition protects him from the possibility 
of guilt by reputation. Evidence received by a 
jury in a criminal prosecution must pass 
stringent tests of competency and relevancy. A 
defendant's previous brushes with the law, in and 
of themselves, are simply irrelevant to his guilt 
or innocence of the crime with which he is 
charged. . . . When such evidence inadvertently 
reaches the attention of the jury, it is most 
difficult if not impossible to assume continued 
integrity of the presumption of innocence. A 
drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of 
milk. 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd 
Cir. 1976). Accord United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 
(D. C. Cir. 1985) (Evidence of prior crime always prejudicial to 
defendant as it diverts attention of jury from question of 
defendant's responsibility for crime charged to improper issue of 
his bad character); United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3rd 
Cir. 1976) (long standing tradition protects criminal defendant from 
"guilt by reputation" and from "unnecessary prejudice".) 
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The State's response that evidence of prior convictions is 
an element of the crime fails to address the constitutional 
challenge to subsection (h).5 
The State cites the Model Penal Code which offers the 
rationale behind subsection (h) as an aggravating circumstance. 
Brief of Respondent at 38. However, the Model Penal Code also 
suggests that evidence of prior crimes should be admitted only at 
the penalty phase and to admit such evidence at the guilt phase may 
be unconstitutional. See Model Penal Code §210.6 commentary at 
144-45 (1980). 
The State relies on Alabama and Oregon as states having 
passed on this question. While both states have statutes with 
aggravating circumstances at the guilt phase similar to that in 
question in this case,6 a review of the statutes of all fifty states 
demonstrates that states allowing such evidence at the guilt phase 
are a very small minority. See Addendum B. In addition, an even 
greater distinction exists in that neither Alabama or Oregon has 
statutory language recognizing prejudicial impact of prior 
5
* The State relies on State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah 
1985), for the proposition that M[e]vidence of prior crimes is 
admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a specific element 
of the crime for which a defendant is on trial." Brief of 
Respondent at 38. This quote from Pacheco, however, is dicta as the 
Court also stated that ff[t]he evidence is not admissible if it is 
relevant solely to show a defendant's propensity to commit crime." 
Id. The Court then ultimately held in Pacheco that the admission of 
the testimony in question has prejudicial error. Ij3. In any event, 
reliance on Pacheco is unwarranted as it also fails to address the 
constitutionality of the element in question. 
6
* Notably, both the Alabama and Oregon statutes allow prior 
convictions for murder only whereas the Utah Statute allows prior 
convictions for murder and/or felonies involving violence. 
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convictions as does Utah. Accordingly, the cases cited from those 
jurisdictions are less persuasive than they might initially appear. 
The State also asserts that Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 
(1967), condones the admission of prior convictions at the 
guilt/innocence phase. In Spencer v. Texas, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld convictions under Texas recidivist 
statutes which provided harsher penalties for repeat offenders. 
Under Texas law, jurors were informed of prior convictions at the 
guilt/innocence phase. Ironically, by the time the appeal reached 
the Supreme Court, Texas had changed to a two-stage trial procedure; 
however, the Supreme Court held that convictions under the old 
procedure did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due 
process. 
Spencer v. Texas was decided in 1967 prior to Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) which re-opened the legitimacy of state 
death penalty statutes struck down in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972). Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and its companion cases 
emphasized the bifurcated trial process as the acceptable scheme to 
obviate the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the earlier 
deficient state statutes. Subsequent cases further indicated that 
because death as punishment is unique and irreversible, greater 
procedural protections are required through all states of the 
process. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); accord State v. 
Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983). 
Spencer v. Texas, as "old" law, is unpersuasive in light of 
the subsequent decisions in Furman v. Georgia, supra, and Gregg v. 
Georgia, supra. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
authored an opinion suggesting that Spencer v, Texas would not be 
decided the same in a federal court. United States v. Daniels, 770 
F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985), That court stated that its opinion was 
"guided but not controlled" by the Spencer v. Texas decision. Id. 
at 1116. 
Similarly, with Utah's expressed position through 
legislation, case law, and evidentiary rules, Spencer v. Texas is 
not controlling in this case. It would not be persuasive for Utah 
to follow an opinion which addressed an underlying Texas law 
directly at odds with the Utah law. This fact is especially true 
when Texas has since conformed their recidivist statutes questioned 
in Spencer v. Texas to be in line with Utah's habitual criminal 
statute. 
Furthermore, the Utah Constitution is more demanding than 
that examined in Spencer v. Texas. Article I, Section 7, states 
that "[n]o person shall be deprived to life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." This Court has interpreted Utah's due 
process clause to afford greater protections to the accused. See 
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), (extending due process 
protections to safeguard an accused from the refiling of criminal 
charges already dismissed at a preliminary hearing) and State v. 
Saunders, 699 p.2D 738, 742 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. McCumber, 
622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980)). (Recognizing due process is violated 
when prejudicial evidence reaches the jury where severance would 
have cured the prejudice). 
When Utah's due process clause is coupled with Utah's 
expansive version of the protection against cruel and unusual 
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punishment set forth in Article I, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution,^ the result should be to afford the greatest possible 
protection to those who face the most severe punishment of death. 
The State additionally argues that a limiting instruction 
given to the jury could correct any potential prejudice. Brief of 
Respondent at 42. Such a claim is without merit. The Model Penal 
Code states: 
Trial lawyers understandably have little 
confidence in the intermediate solution of 
admitting such evidence and trusting an 
instruction to limit its consideration to 
sentencing rather than guilt. 
Model Penal Code 210.6 Commentary at 145 (1980). Courts also have 
recognized the futility of such a corrective instruction. See 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); United States v. 
Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1985); Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1976). 
Finally, the State cites Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 
1263 (10th Cir. 1986), in support of its argument that even if 
subsection (h) is unconstitutional, "this Court should affirm the 
conviction because of the presence of two other aggravating 
factors." Brief of Respondent at 43. 
The aggravating circumstances challenged at the penalty 
phase in Andrew v. Shulsen, supra, was "the killing for personal 
gain." Such an aggravating circumstance does not have the 
capability of tainting the entire guilt phase of a trial as does 
evidence of prior crimes. 
'• See Article I, Section 9, Utah Constitution; State v. Bishop, 
717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) . 
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Andrews v. Shulsen, supray also leaves room for an 
unconstitutional finding of one aggravating circumstance which may 
invalidate the others. The court states: 
When one of the charged circumstances later 
proves invalid or unsupported by the record, 
however, the validity of the death sentence 
"depends on the function of the jury's finding of 
an aggravating circumstance under [the State's] 
capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons 
that the aggravating circumstance at issue in 
[the] particular case was found to be invalid." 
Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting in 
part Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 864 (1983)). The admission of 
prior convictions into the guilt/innocence phase is highly 
prejudicial. The prejudice that subsection (h) introduced in the 
guilt/innocence phase infected the total guilt finding process, 
including the determination on the remaining aggravating 
circumstances charged. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the conviction of 
Mr. Gardner and order a new trial where prejudicial prior 
convictions are not allowed to reach the jury. 
POINT VII 
(Reply to Respondent's Point VII) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT 
GRANTING AN APPROPRIATE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE. 
This Court should not hesitate to review the question as to 
whether the trial court committed reversible error by not granting 
an appropriate challenge for cause. Unlike the situation in State 
v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986)(cited by the State) where 
defense counsel made no objection, defense counsel objected 
vigorously to Mr. Copinga (R. 1807-1809). Later in discussions 
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relating to juror challenges, both defense counsel and the trial 
court indicated confusion as to the decision on Mr. Copinga (R. 
1938). Although in the midst of the confusion counsel ultimately 
stated, ffI think what we will do is withdraw on Copinga", he had 
already clearly delineated and recorded his objection. In light of 
the specifically outlined objection and the need for heightened 
scrutiny as set forth in State v. Norton, supra, this issue should 
be reviewed. 
The totality of Mr. Copinga's voir dire indicates a 
predisposition to impose a death sentence over life where one is 
convicted of homicide. When asked by the court after a lengthy 
statement regarding the guilt and penalty phase of a capital 
homicide case whether he could return a life sentence, Mr. Copinga 
responded, "If that's the only verdict" (R. 1408). In light of Mr. 
Copinga's voir dire response when reviewed as a whole, the trial 
court committed reversible error in refusing to grant the defense 
challenge for cause of Mr. Copinga. 
POINT VIII 
(Reply to Respondent's Point VIII) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING SECURITY GUARDS 
TO SURROUND MR. GARDNER DURING THE TRIAL 
In its response, the State concedes that the "method of 
restraining the defendant was not a good practice." (Respondent's 
Brief at 47). The State claims, however, that this practice was not 
inherently prejudicial to Mr. Gardner and that counsel for Mr. 
Gardner should have requested to voir dire the jurors to determine 
if they were influenced or biased by the presence of the guards. 
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The State correctly notes that many courts have held that 
the presence of security guards is not inherently prejudicial to 
defendants. The State seems to have misapprehended Mr. Gardner's 
position. Appellant contends that not only was security excessive 
but also that the actions of the guards in placing themselves 
between Mr. Gardner and the jury was inherently prejudicial. 
The major case that the State relies on is Holbrook v. 
Flynn, 475 U.S. , 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). Holbrook stands for 
the proposition that the presence of four uniformed state troopers 
in a courtroom does not violate a defendant's constitutional right 
to a fair trial. The facts in Holbrook are easily distinguishable 
from those in the instant case. The Court in Holbrook stated, "If 
they are placed at some distance from the accused, security officers 
may well be perceived more as elements of an impressive drama than 
as reminders of the defendant's special status." Holbrook, 89 
L.Ed.2d at 525. In the instant case the guards were not "placed at 
some distance from the accused" but were placed between Mr. Gardner 
and the jury and immediately jumped up to encircle Mr. Gardner 
whenever a recess was taken. 
The Court in Holbrook discussed the difference between the 
number of guards at a trial and other practices by stating: 
The chief feature that distinguishes the use of 
identifiable security officers from courtroom 
practices we might find inherently prejudicial is 
the wider range of inferences that a juror might 
reasonably draw from the officers' presence. 
While shackling and prison clothes are 
ummistakable indications of the need to separate 
a defendant from the community at large, the 
presence of guards at a defendant's trial need 
not be interpreted as a sign that he is 
particularly dangerous or culpable. 
Id. at 534. 
In the instant case, the fact the guards jumped up and 
surrounded Mr. Gardner must have been interpreted as "a sign that he 
is particularly dangerous or culpable." The guards in this case did 
much more than quietly sit in the spectator section of the courtroom 
as had the guards in Holbrook. 
In the instant case, the trial court by allowing the jury 
to view Mr. Gardner as a threat and in continued custody, 
effectively denied Mr. Gardner his right to have his guilt or 
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced 
at trial. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)(declaring 
right of accused to have guilt or innocence determined solely on 
basis of evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of 
continued custody). 
Many courts have held that excessive security in the form 
of shackling is inherently prejudicial. The instant case is more 
like the shackling cases that Mr. Gardner cited in his opening brief 
than the presence of security guard cases that the Respondent 
cited. By allowing the guards to surround Mr. Gardner at every 
recess, the trial court allowed the impression that Mr. Gardner was 
a violent person who needed to be closely guarded. 
In Commonwealth v. DeVasto, 387 N.E.2d 1173 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1979), a conviction for assault and battery upon a correctional 
officer was reversed because the defendant was forced to remain 
handcuffed and guarded by uniformed correctional officers during his 
trial. ff[A] judge who contemplates approving such measures should 
state his reasons (including recommendations received from the 
custodial authority) in the presence of counsel and [the] defendant, 
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and out of the presence of veniremen or jury, and provide an 
opportunity for counsel to make their objection known." Id. at 
1171, quoting (Commonwealth v, Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830, 836 (1973)). 
Brown also stated that "the least drastic and conspicuous measures 
reasonably available that meet the particular need should be 
employed." Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d at 836. 
In the present case, the trial court did not state its 
reasons on the record for allowing this highly prejudicial 
practice. Nor did the trial court "provide an opportunity for 
counsel to make their objection known" prior to trial. Finally, the 
practice allowed by the trial court did not meet "the least drastic 
and conspicuous measures reasonable available" test found in Brown. 
The State contends that the problem of the actions of the 
guards was cured at the second day of trial and since "the trial 
lasted several days it is likely that the jury forgot witnessing any 
restraint of defendant by the guards." (Brief of Respondent at 
47). The State cites no cases to support this proposition. The 
Appellant made his motion for a mistrial just prior to the lunch 
recess on October 16. The trial started October 15 and both sides 
rested on October 18. Trial resumed October 22 with closing 
argument and a verdict being reached. Thus, this was not such a 
long trial that the jury would have forgotten what happened on the 
first day and a half. In a similar situation a court reasoned that, 
"It may be doubted whether any jury, even with the best of 
cautionary instructions, can ever dismiss from its mind that the 
accused has appeared before it in handcuffs or chains. His being 
restrained must carry obvious implications even to the most 
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fair-minded of juries." State v, Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 205 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965). The same principle applies in the 
instant case in that the actions of the guards were such that the 
relief granted by the trial court did not erase the action from the 
minds of the jurors. And while the trial court did grant some 
future relief, defense counsel in no way withdrew their motion for a 
mistrial based on what had already occurred (R. 2170). 
Finally the State contends that the Appellant should have 
requested to voir dire the jurors to determine if they were 
influenced or prejudiced by the security guards. In discussing the 
issue of whether to voir dire a jury in the context of the effect of 
a newscast this court stated: 
In refusing to poll the jury,the district court 
suggested that to question the jurors 
individually concerning the broadcast may have 
created more suspicion and prejudice against the 
defendant than it prevented. We agree. 
State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 553 (Utah 1983). 
By conducting a voir dire of the jurors the Appellant might 
very well have created "more suspicion and prejudice than it 
prevented." 
Furthermore in Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court said: 
Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as 
inherently prejudicial, therefore, the question 
must be not whether jurors actually articulated a 
consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but 
rather whether "an unacceptable risk is presented 
of impermissible factors coming into play." 
89 L.Ed.2d at 535 (citations omitted). Therefore even if the jurors 
had been voir dired their responses would not be dispositive. 
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In this case, there was "an unacceptable risk presented of 
impermissible factors11 playing a part in the jury's decision* The 
practice of surrounding Mr. Gardner at each recess goes beyond not 
being a good practice as the State contends. This practice in a 
capital case involving an escape from custody and extensive 
pre-trial publicity regarding the violent nature of the defendant is 
inherently prejudicial. By placing guards between Mr. Gardner and 
the jury, the trial court allowed a practice which must have led the 
jury to conclude that Mr. Gardner was a threat to them. In fact, 
after the jury reached its verdict, the judge asked whether any of 
the jurors wanted to be accompanied to their cars and some responded 
affirmatively (R. 2602). Mr. Gardner therefore deserves a new trial 
where the only evidence the jury is allowed to consider comes from 
the witness stand and not from a courtroom atmosphere which breeds 
fear and prejudice against the defendant. 
POINT X 
(Reply to Respondent's Point X) 
THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER JORGENSEN SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN PERMITTED SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED 
IN VIOLATION OF MR. GARDNER'S FIFTH AND SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR THE 
IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION. 
The State does not argue that Mr. Jorgensen's testimony 
would have been admissible in the State's case-in-chief and seems to 
accept Mr. Gardner's position that admission of such testimony in 
the case-in-chief would have violated Mr. Gardner's Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights (See Brief of Respondent at 51-52). The State, 
however, claims the testimony is subject to the impeachment 
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exception and thus admissible in rebuttal. See Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 
(1971), Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 298, 307 (1984) Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, 307 (1984). While the United States Supreme Court has 
not applied the impeachment exception to evidence admitted in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit has done so in United States v. McManaman, 606 
F.2d 919, 924, 25 (10th Cir. 1979). 
Where the impeachment exception has been applied, the 
appellate court, however, acknowledged two factors that make 
otherwise inadmissible testimony admissible as impeachment. First, 
the testimony must be offered to rebut the defendant's own 
testimony. Walder at 64, Hass at 577, Elstad at 231, United States 
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980). The second element 
consistently present in each of these cases was an instruction by 
the judge to the jury explaining that the rebuttal testimony was to 
be "considered only in passing on petitioner's credibility and not 
as evidence of guilt." Harris at 223. See also Walder at 64, Hass 
at 717. Elstad did not deal specifically with the question of 
impeachment and only discussed the impeachment exception in broad 
terms. McManaman also included a jury instruction on the proper use 
of impeachment testimony. 606 F.2d 919, 924. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has said that a cautionary instruction is clearly required when 
otherwise inadmissible testimony is admitted as impeachment. United 
States v. Sisto, 543 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976). In United States v. 
Lester, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
said "under this circuit's established rule, it is obvious that the 
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District Court's failure to advise the jury that Bevin's prior 
inconsistent statement could be received only for impeachment 
purposes and not for substantive proof of appellant Lester's crime 
was plain error affecting substantial rights." 491 F.2d 680, 683. 
Because no such instruction was given in Mr. Gardner's 
case, either at the time of the testimony (R. 2481-2497) or during 
the jury instructions (R. 544-596), the jury was not aware that it 
was to treat Officer Jorgensen's testimony as impeachment or that 
the officer's testimony was not to be used as substantive proof of 
Mr. Gardner's guilt or innocence. As a result, it is very likely 
the jury treated the testimony as substantive evidence.8 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that failure to give 
cautionary instructions sua sponte is reversible error when the 
failure denies the defendant a fair trial. State v. Shabata, 678 
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984). The Court went on to say "the 
application of this rule is especially appropriate where the 
instructions that were given generally covered the subject matter." 
Id. In Mr. Gardner's case, no instructions were given to the jury 
explaining the difference between evidence used for impeachment and 
evidence used to determine substantive guilt or innocence. (R. 
544-596). 
**• As pointed out in Mccormick on Evidence, p.513: "As a practical 
matter, it seems unlikely that jurors would be either inclined or 
able to make this distinction [between considering the testimony 
only as bearing upon the accused credibility as a witness and not as 
tending to prove the accused's guilt of the crime charged.] " . . . 
[i]t is unrealistic to conclude that the testimony will be 
considered only for purposes of credibility evaluation." 
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More importantly, Officer Jorgensen's testimony was the 
only testimony which indicated that Mr. Gardner knowingly shot 
Michael Burdell. See Appellant's Brief at 79. As a result, 
admission of the testimony without an instruction was clearly a 
factor in jury's resulting decision to find Mr. Gardner guilty of 
intentional murder. This specific injury combined with the broader 
consideration given capital cases should prompt this court to find 
that the admission of Officer Jorgensen's testimony which was taken 
in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and the failure of the Court to instruct the jury on 
the proper consideration of Officer Jorgensen's testimony was 
manifest and prejudicial error requiring reversal of Mr. Gardner's 
convictions. 
POINT XI 
(Reply to Respondent's Brief Point XI) 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INCORRECT DEFINITION OF MANSLAUGHTER 
IN JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21 PRECLUDED JURY CONSIDERATION 
OF THE EXTREME DISTURBANCE MANSLAUGHTER THEORY OF THE 
CASE. 
The State concedes that Mr. Gardner was entitled to a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The 
State's position is that Instruction No. 34 (Addendum S in 
Appellant's opening brief), which the court gave instead of 
defendant's proferred Instruction No. 21 (Addendum R in Appellant's 
opening brief), correctly defines the extreme disturbance variety of 
manslaughter. Although the State raises several contentions in this 
regard, most are adequately addressed in Mr. Gardner's opening 
brief. Appellant's reply on this point will be limited specifically 
to Respondent's contention that he has misread the language and 
intent of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205(1)(b) (1953 as amended 1975). 
The State acknowledges the extraordinary breadth of the 
manslaughter statute Utah adopted from the Model Penal Code (MPC) in 
1973, but argues that amendments to the statute show that Utah's 
statute at the relevant time was far narrower in its scope than its 
MPC antecedent. 
Although the legislative history is somewhat ambiguous, it 
cannot honestly be interpreted to support Respondent's contention. 
In the State's view, the statute as adopted in 1973 consisted of 
distinct objective and subjective parts.9 The allegedly subjective 
part, subsection 2 of the 1973 statute, was deleted in 1975. Thus 
respondent reasons that the statute set up a purely objective test 
after 1975. 
This is incorrect. Section 76-5-205 is a careful fusion of 
objective and subjective considerations; the standard thus created 
was unaffected by the 1975 deletion of the language in former 
subpoint 2. The plain language of the statute after 1975 still 
required the factfinder to determine whether an accused's 
explanation for his extreme mental or emotional disturbance was 
reasonable. The question between 1973 and 1975 was, "is it 
reasonable that the accused was disturbed?" The 1975 deletion of 
9* (1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
. . . 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; 
(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse of the actor 
. . . shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the 
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to 
be. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1973). 
- 32 -
some statutory language did not alter the question to "would a 
reasonable man have been disturbed?" The subjective element of the 
statute was unaltered by the 1975 amendment. 
Section 76-5-205 was amended a second time in 1985.10 This 
time, the legislature added language to the statute specifically 
requiring the reasonableness of the accused's explanation or excuse 
to be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. Applying the amended statute in the 
present case would have led to a formulation something like this: 
"Would a reasonable borderline mentally retarded person who is in 
shackles and has just been handed a gun reasonably find himself 
under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance if he were 
shot in the shoulder?" In other words, the question under the 1985 
amendment remains "Is it reasonable that the accused was 
disturbed?" 
The 1985 amendment was not in effect on April 2, 1985. 
However, Respondent argues that it elucidates §76-5-205 for the 
court's purposes in this case because it "merely clarif[ies] the 
limitations to the manslaughter mitigation which the legislature 
1°* (1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
. . . 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; 
(2) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse . . . shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (Supp. 1985). 
intended when it removed the subjective element in 1975." 
Respondent's Brief at 55. 
Respondent's position is refuted by the comments of the 
1985 amendment's sponsor, Representative Lyle Hillyard. 
The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse 
would be based on the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person under the then-existing circumstances, so 
we've gone to an objective standard rather than a 
subjective standard in these tests . . . 
State of Rep. Lyle Hillyard, Utah State Legislature, S.B. 
127, disc. 50 (February 5, 1985) (Emphasis added). 
The Representative's remark indicates that his amendment was a 
modification rather than a clarification of the statute. 
In summary, the language of §76-5-205 and its legislative 
history support the position that the statute was as broad in its 
scope as its MPC antecedent on April 2, 1985. 
In regard to this interpretation of §76-5-205, the State 
attacks Mr. Gardner's reliance on State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 
(1976). The relevant issue in Gaxiola was whether the court's 
definitions of certain words in §76-5-205 had arbitrarily limited 
the nature of the antecedent circumstances that may justify 
mitigation. The court held that the definitions given had not 
achieved this indisputably improper end. 
The importance of Gaxiola for Mr. Gardner is that even 
after the 1975 amendment of §76-5-205, this Court cited with 
approval from the Model Penal Code Commentary to then Section 
201.3. Gaxiola refutes the State's hypothesis of §76-5-205's sharp 
divergence from the MPC in 1975. 
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For the reasons stated here and in Appellant's opening 
brief, the court's instruction on extreme disturbance manslaughter 
incorrectly defined that offense and precluded jury consideration of 
this theory of the case* 
POINT XII 
(Reply to Respondent's Point XII) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES 
COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AFTER UNANIMOUSLY FINDING 
THAT MR. GARDNER DID NOT COMMIT FIRST DEGREE HOMICIDE, 
In State v. Clayton/ 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983)/ a case 
involving a charge of attempted murder, the district court 
instructed the jury "that if they were not satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense of 
intentionally and knowingly attempting to cause the death of Edward 
Long, they might find the defendant guilty of any lesser included 
offense whose commission was necessarily included in the offense 
charged." Jj3. at 627 n.2. 
The instruction in Clayton seems only to indicate that 
the jury was to consider the lesser included offenses if they were 
not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the charged offense. 
The instruction given by the trial court in the instant case was 
quite different. The trial court in Mr. Gardner's case instructed 
the jury that before they could even consider any lesser included 
offense they must unanimously find that the defendant did not commit 
first-degree homicide. This instruction did much more than "direct 
the jury to begin by determining whether the defendant was guilty of 
the charged offense." I^d. at 627. The instruction in the instant 
case forbade the jury from even considering a lesser offense until 
unanimously agreeing on first-degree homicide. 
Another important difference in the present case is that 
the instruction was a verbal sua sponte instruction* Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the parties be 
furnished with copies of proposed instructions unless they stipulate 
otherwise. 
Rule 19(a) states: 
The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
action upon the request; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that 
such instructions may be given orally, or 
otherwise waive this requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(a) (1953 as amended). 
In the present case, there is no evidence that the 
parties were informed of the proposed _sua sponte instruction, 
stipulated that it could be given orally or that Mr. Gardner waived 
the requirement that he be furnished with a written copy of the 
proposed instruction. Thus, the sua sponte instruction was given in 
violation of Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because appellate review of capital cases merits a 
heightened scrutiny in reviewing the record for "manifest and 
prejudicial" error, (State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983) 
(citing State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982)). See also 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 (1976)), this Court should look beyond 
Clayton and not allow Mr. Gardner's conviction to be based on a 
verbal sua sponte instruction. In a case involving questions of 
intent and mental state, it was prejudicial error for the trial 




(Reply to Respondent's Point XIV) 
MR. GARDNER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE 
TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Contrary to the State's contention, the record is clear 
that the prosecution laughed during the questioning of Mr. Gardner's 
brother. The following occurred during the questioning of Mr. 
Gardner's brother: 
Q: Is he capable of emotion? 
A: Yes. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: Your Honor, I am going to 
object to this laughing when I question witnesses 
and the snickering on the part of the 
prosecution. I think that is unprofessional. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. ANDREW VALDEZ: And I would like the record 
to reflect that they are doing that, and my 
client is on trial for his life. 
THE COURT: All right. That's enough argument. 
The record may so show. 
THE WITNESS: It is nothing to laugh at. 
(R. 2771). 
The State's position that because the trial judge did not 
consider the laughter prejudicial that this Court should rule 
likewise is without merit. (Brief of Respondent at 66) This Court 
in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) reversed an arson 
conviction even though the trial court had not found the 
prosecutor's actions worthy of a mistrial. 
The State's argument in regard to the reading of the 
medical reports is that since they were read during the 
cross-examination of Dr. Heinbecker the same could be read during 
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closing argument. While Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
might have allowed these statements in Dr. Heinbecker's 
cross-examination no rule allows the prosecution to read from these 
reports not in evidence during closing argument. 
The final area of prosecutorial misconduct concerns the 
prosecutor's use of escape evidence. The appellant argues that 
there was no evidence that he had ever escaped from maximum 
security. In State v. Busby, 464 So. 2d 262, 267 (La. 1985) the 
court stated, "The prosecutor's remarks about societal cost of a 
life sentence, misspent tax dollar, future escapes, more killing by 
defendant, were improper." Perhaps the most egregious instance of 
misconduct occurred in the questioning of Dennis Fuchs, Chairman of 
the Utah Board of Pardons. Mr. Fuchs was called by Appellant and 
questioned about procedures of parole hearings for people convicted 
of First Degree Murder. On cross-examination the prosecutor 
questioned Mr. Fuchs about three individuals who had been convicted 
of First Degree Murder and had escaped from prison (R. 2827-29). 
This questioning went well beyond direct questioning and was 
extremely prejudicial. The whole issue during the penalty phase of 
the trial was whether to put Mr. Gardner in prison or kill him. 
When the jury was told that no prison could hold Mr. Gardner and 
that other similarly situated inmates had escaped, its verdict was a 
foregone conclusion. This questioning clearly violated the tenets 
of Troy and resulted in an unreliable verdict. The fact that 
defense counsel did not object to the cross-examination of Mr. Fuchs 
is irrelevant because as this Court stated in State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982). "On direct appeal in capital cases, it is 
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the established rule that this Court will review an error, even 
though no proper objection was made at trial and even though the 
error was not raised on appeal, if the error was manifest and 
prejudicial." 
When viewed individually, and especially when viewed 
collectively, the incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in this case 
very probably influenced the jury and accordingly Mr. Gardner should 
be given a new trial free from these abuses. 
POINT XVI 
(Reply to Respondent's Point XVI) 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED 
TO ALLOW THE JURY TO RECEIVE TWO PIECES OF RELEVANT 
MITIGATING EVIDENCE. 
In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 85-6756, 41 Crim. L. Rep. 3071 
(decided April 22, 1987) the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
earlier opinions that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider or 
be precluded from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence.'" 
Id. at 3071 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. , 
(1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)). The 
Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by narrowly 
interpreting the statute and invalidated the death sentence which 
had been imposed. 
In the case at bar, the trial judge similarly abused his 
discretion by interpreting the statute so narrowly as to prevent the 
proffered mitigating evidence from being heard by the jury. This 
abuse of discretion is especially clear when recognizing that Utah's 
statute is broader than that examined in Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra 
in that it is open ended, allowing any other fact in mitigation to 
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be presented to the jury. The Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-207(2), states: 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, 
evidence may be presented as to any matter the 
court deems relevant to sentence, including but 
not limited to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, background, 
history, mental and physical condition, and any 
other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the 
penalty. Any evidence the court deems to have 
probative force may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of 
evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant 
shall be permitted to present argument for or 
against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 
76-5-202. 
(Emphasis added). 
The rationale behind the introduction of the affidavits is 
two-fold: First, the affidavits are relevant because the jury must 
determine that the death penalty is justified and appropriate. A 
competent review of Mr. Gardner's crime in relation to penalty 
deserved is functionally impossible without a comparison or backdrop 
of other capital cases. Without such a backdrop, any first degree 
murder conviction could arbitrarily be found to merit the death 
penalty by any random jury. The jury needs to know the sentence 
imposed in other cases to make a fair and impartial determination of 
proper penalty. 
Second, the actual jury sentencing Mr. Gardner was exposed 
to some information of other homicide cases and sentences received. 
At least half of the actual jurors discussed other capital cases 
during voir dire indicating capital defendants who received the 
death penalty: Bundy, Bishop, Gilmore, Franklin, and Lance and 
Kelbach, among others (R. 1441, 1506, 1510-11, 1738, 1739, 1833). 
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This information, in part, was erroneous or misguided and could have 
thwarted a fair determination of the appropriate sentence for Mr. 
Gardner. The proffered affidavits would have supplied the correct 
and true data to have insured a fair determination. Accordingly, 
the affidavits were relevant and the court abused its discretion in 
refusing to permit the jury to review them. 
The State argues that this Court should narrowly interpret 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207(2) and not allow the affidavits as evidence 
in mitigation. The State contends that the affidavits are not 
relevant and do not address the nature of Mr. Gardner's crime. Such 
a narrow construction of the broader language in the statute is 
unacceptable in a capital case which requires that statutes not be 
given a strict construction, and that the accused be given the 
benefit of any information which may mitigate against receiving the 
death penalty. Any information which does so mitigate becomes 
relevant to the defendant and his crime. 
The State cites Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81, 93 (Utah 
1983) ("Andrews v. Morris 11"), for the proposition that only the 
defendant and his crimes should be examined. Brief of Respondent at 
72. This reference from Andrews v. Morris II, however, is taken out 
of context. Andrews v. Morris II addresses the question of the 
retroactivity of State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), to cases 
finalized before the Wood decision. As such, the quote utilized by 
the State is unpersuasive when discussing the relevance of 
mitigating circumstances. 
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The State also cites Andrews v. Morris/ 607 P.2d 816, 805 
(Utah 1980) ("Andrews v. Morris I") to support their position. 
Brief of Respondent at 73. Andrews v. Morris I, while more on 
point, takes a broader look than that now requested by Mr. Gardner. 
Andrews v. Morris I examines the entire system and the arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty. The court adopted language from 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, 
denied 440 U.S. 976 (1979), wherein a statute was challenged as 
being administered "impermissibly and discriminatorily by 
prosecutors in the plea bargaining process against defendants 
convicted of murdering whites as opposed to blacks, and against 
males and poor persons." Andrews v. Morris I at 825. Mr. Gardner's 
focus is more narrow; he requests only that the jury be permitted to 
view ten affidavits of prior capital cases as a backdrop to deciding 
his fate. 
Furthermore, in Andrews v. Morris I only one other justice 
joined Justice Hall in the opinion. The opinion is therefore a 
plurality opinion, not a majority opinion, and Mr. Gardner 
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider the earlier 
position. Mr. Gardner contends that the more expansive language of 
Utah's Article I, Section 9 than its federal counterpart must be 
interpreted to allow the jury to view mitigating evidence such as 
the affidavits to avoid treating an individual with unnecessary 
rigor. Without such information the jury is without a meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the death penalty is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not. See Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
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The rationale behind the relevancy of the proferred 
testimony of Kay Henry and other close friends and religious 
colleagues of Mr. Burdell is similar to the rationale for allowing 
the jury to review the affidavits. The broad language of the 
statute allows for any mitigating evidence, including the testimony 
that Mr. Burdell was opposed to Capital Punishment and would not 
have wanted Mr. Gardner to be executed. 
The State cites Booth v. Maryland, 86-5020, 41 Crim. L. 
Rep. (decided June 15, 1987), as controlling the question of the 
proffered testimony of victims — or their friends or family. 
However, Booth v. Maryland addressed the question of a Victim Impact 
Statement as an aggravating circumstance not a mitigating 
circumstance. The two are intrinsically distinct in operation. 
Aggravating circumstances operate to narrow the class of those 
eligible for the death penalty [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 513 
(1976)], while mitigating circumstances allow states to provide 
individualized considerations for the capital defendant to mitigate 
against the imposition of the death penalty. See generally, Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
In Booth v. Maryland, supra, the Supreme Court in its 
holding demonstrated the significant distinction between the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstance and philosophy. The Court 
stated, "[the] admission [of victim impact statements] creates a 
constitutionally inacceptable risk that the jury may impose the 
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.11 IjA. at 3283. 
That concern and finding by the Court is only a concern with 
aggravating circumstances. Such a concern is not present with 
mitigating circumstances. 
Accordingly, the proffered testimony that Mr. Burdell was 
opposed to capital punishment is constitutionally permissible and 
demanded by the language of the statute. The trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow the testimony to reach the jury, 
thereby preventing the jury from reaching a sentencing decision 
based on all the evidence. Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the sentence imposed and order a new sentencing 
hearing where all mitigating evidence is allowed to reach the jury. 
POINT XVII 
(Reply to Respondent's Point XVII) 
UTAH STATUTE AND CONSTITUTION ESTABLISH THAT 
IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE IS 
ARBITRARY AND DISPROPORTIONATE WITH OTHER 
DEATH PENALTY CASES. 
While the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution does not require appellate courts to conduct a case 
comparative proportionality review when reviewing death penalty 
cases (See Pulley v. Harris, 466 U.S. 37 (1984)), Article I, Section 
9 of the Utah Constitution is not so limited. Article I, Section 9 
provides: 
Sec. 9. Excessive bail shall not be required; 
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. (Emphasis added). 
While this provision has not been interpreted in the 
context of whether it requires a comparison with other potential 
death penalty cases to establish that the punishment is not 
unnecessarily rigorous, the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the Utah Constitutional provision is broader than the federal 
protection based on the last sentence in the article. See State v. 
Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). This broader protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment, and punishment imposed without 
unnecessary rigor, requires a comparative case review on appeal of a 
death sentence "to avoid arbitrariness and to assure 
proportionality." See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). 
In addition to the constitutional requirement, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-104 (1953 as amended) specifically provides for appellate 
case comparison. (See Appellant's Brief at 137 for text of statute). 
Section (3) of the statute expressly requires the 
sentencing body, when imposing a penalty, to consider differences in 
the rehabilitation possibilities among individual defendants. The 
requirement may be satisfied only if a system of review is employed 
which compares the facts and circumstances of the case reviewed with 
the circumstances and penalties imposed in other cases within the 
jurisdiction for which a defendant has been convicted of a similar 
offense. 
The State contends that this Court had the opportunity to 
interpret §76-1-104 in the cases of Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 
(Utah 1983) and State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). (State's 
brief at 82). However, the issue as to whether §76-1-104(3) and (4) 
mandates appellate case comparison was not before the Court in 
either case and was not addressed by this Court. Mr. Gardner should 
not be denied judicial interpretation of this statute simply because 
the Court could have, on its own motion, addressed the issue in 
prior cases. 
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Furthermore, the state misinterprets this Court's decision 
in State v. Wood, supra, when it argues that this Court held that 
the sentencing body must not look at other death penalty cases but 
must consider only the circumstances of the particular crime charged 
to the defendant and the background and personal characteristics of 
the defendant (State's brief at 82). Nowhere in the opinion does 
the Court indicate that a comparison with other death penalty cases 
may or must not be made when determining the proportionality of the 
penalty. On the contrary, the language in Wood suggests the 
opposite. This Court indicated that not only should the 
circumstances of the particular offense and characteristics of the 
defendant be considered, but the sentencing body must also consider 
the defendant's culpability as compared with the culpability of 
defendants convicted of a similar offense. The Wood Court stated: 
Although the Eighth Amendment does not deprive 
. . the State of the power to impose the death 
penalty for those who commit murder, it does 
require recognition of the fact that even among 
murderers there are those who are less culpable 
than others and that the death penalty is not 
appropriate in all cases. Therefore, the 
standards which guide the sentencing body must 
focus on the circumstances as well as the 
background and personal characteristics of the 
defendant. (Emphasis added). 
Wood, 648 P.2d at 77. Mr. Gardner agrees that the language clearly 
suggests that a sentencing body must consider the circumstances of 
the particular offense and the characteristics of the defendant but 
in addition, this must be compared with the circumstances and 
characteristics of others convicted of the same offense. To neglect 
the latter is to prevent the reviewing body from determining 
differences in culpability among individual defendants. The only 
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method to determine those individuals who are most culpable and for 
whom the death penalty is appropriate is an intercase review and 
comparison of Mr. Gardner's case with those Utah cases in which the 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 
death and those convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. This 
system of review, is routinely used by the United States Supreme 
Court when reviewing death penalty cases (Appellant's Brief footnote 
20 at 140). 
Finally, the State argues that this Court rejected a case 
by comparison as a system of death penalty review in Andrews v. 
Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980), cert denied, 499 U.S. 891 (1980) 
and again in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) and 
therefore it is unnecessary for this Court to address Mr. Gardner's 
argument that the death penalty is disproportionate to his crime 
(State's Brief at 82). Mr. Gardner contends that Andrews is 
inapplicable to Mr. Gardner's appeal. Andrews was a habeas corpus 
proceeding brought by the defendant to challenge his death sentence 
on the grounds that it was imposed arbitrarily and as a result of 
racial discrimination. The Court's refusal to adopt a case by case 
comparison and its holding in Andrews is narrow in its 
application—applying only to claims of racial discrimination in the 
imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 98. Andrews did not 
involve a claim of disproportionality under Utah Statute §76-1-104 
of the Utah Constitution. In addition, the Court in Andrews based 
its decision on the fact that Andrews failed to substantiate his 
claim that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily with 
information regarding the facts and circumstances of other cases in 
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which a defendant convicted of first degree murder should have, but 
did not receive the death penalty. Jjd. at 97. Mr. Gardner in his 
opening brief clearly provides information including facts and 
circumstances of other cases which demonstrate that the sentence of 
death was disproportionately applied. (Appellant's brief at 
142-146). 
In addition to a comparison with the cases outlined in 
Appellant's opening brief, the fact that Mr. Gardner's death penalty 
sentence is excessive and disproportionate is evident when compared 
with the facts and circumstances of the Hofmann case. Mark Hofmann 
committed an extremely heinous crime for which he was charged with 
two counts of first degree murder arising out of the bombing deaths 
of two individuals. Unlike Mr. Gardner who, while suffering the 
effects of a bullet wound to his shoulder, reflexively shot his 
victim, Mr. Hofmann calculatedly plotted the murders of both of his 
victims. Furthermore, Hofmann created grave risk of death to people 
other than his victims, carried out his murders by using elaborate 
bombs which he fabricated over a period of time prior to his 
commission of the crime and committed the offense in furthering an 
elaborate forgery scheme for pecuniary gain. All of these 
aggravating circumstances were incident to one criminal episode. 
In contrast, of the aggravating circumstances which 
elevated Mr. Gardner's offense to the level of a capital offense, 
only the creation of risk of death to persons other than the victim 
and the commission of the offense for the purpose of escaping from 
custody were related to the death of Mr. Burdell. The third 
aggravating circumstance attributed to Mr. Gardner, the fact that he 
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had a prior conviction for a violent felony bears no relationship to 
the offense for which he was sentenced to die (See Point VI in 
Appellant's opening and reply briefs). 
On January 7, 1987, Mark Hofmann entered into a plea 
agreement with the state. The terms of the agreement permitted Mr. 
Hofmann to plead guilty to two counts of second degree murder. As 
the result of that agreement Mr. Hofmann became no longer eligible 
for the death penalty irrespective of the atrocious nature of his 
crimes. 
It would be inherently unjust to permit Mr. Gardner's death 
sentence to stand in light of the heinous crimes committed and the 
outcome of the Hofmann case, and in comparison to other homicide 
cases in this state where the death penalty was not ultimately 
imposed. (See Appellant's Brief at 144-146). This Court should, in 
compliance with Utah State §76-1-104 (as amended), and Article I, 
Section Nine of the Utah Constitution, adopt a case comparative 
system of review. In comparing Mr. Gardner's offense and penalty 
with other first degree murder cases, including the Hofmann case, 
this Court should find that the death penalty has been applied 
arbitrarily and disproportionately in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors complained of in this brief affected trial and 
penalty phase proceedings. 
With respect to the errors claimed to have occurred prior 
to trial and at trial, Appellant, Ronnie Lee Gardner, seeks reversal 
of his convictions and remand of his case to the district court for 
- 49 -
dismissal of the first degree homicide charge and/or a new trial. 
With respect to the errors concerning the penalty phase, Appellant 
requests reversal of his sentence of death and remand to the 
district court with either an order imposing a sentence of life or 
an order for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
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ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM A 
1. Mr. Varoz (R. 1479-1491) in recalling the facts stated 
"The defendant was handed a handgun by a woman accomplice, and the 
defendant sought to escape. In the process of escaping he fired a 
gun several times, and as a result, one man was killed, hit in the 
head and killed. Another man was wounded. The defendant was 
wounded himself." (R. 1480). Later, Mr.Varoz added that he had 
accepted the reports in the news media as being factual and that 
based on these reports "I would say that he is guilty of doing it." 
(R. 1486-1487). 
2. Mrs. Carsey (R. 1491-1501) said she received most of 
her information regarding the case discussing it with another juror 
(R. 1491). She also said that she initially had the opinion that 
Mr. Gardner was guilty and that she had made the comment, "Well, if 
he is guilty, why the trial?" However, she said after thinking 
about her comment she was able to answer her own question. 
3. Mr. Jaffa (R. 1513-1526) made the statement regarding 
Mr. Gardner that "I would say someone was shot and he [Gardner] 
probably pulled the trigger." (R. 1518). 
4. Mrs. Olson (R. 1527-1539) had discussed the 
investigation of the case with an investigating officer, her 
brother-in-law, Lt. Anjewierden. And though he had not expressed 
his opinion to her she stated she could presume that his opinion 
would be one of guilt. 
5. Mr. Phillips (R. 1558-1567) stated he had heard Gardner 
in trying to escape had shot a lawyer who had later died. 
6. Mr. Adamson (R. 1600-1611) had discussed the case with 
a number of his associates. During those discussions Mr. Adamson 
was subjected to the opinions that Gardner "deserves what he gets," 
and, from some, that the death penalty should prevail. (R. 1607). 
7. Dr. Haynes (R. 1611-1624) stated he had a tendency to 
believe what he reads in the paper or heard on the television and 
that his initial reaction was "I think I believed he [Mr. Gardner] 
was guilty at that time." (R. 1619). Dr. Haynes was also aware 
that Mr. Gardner had a prior criminal record and was in court the 
day of the shooting regarding a prior criminal action. 
8. Mr. Holt (R. 1636-1647) said he recalled that Gardner 
was a convicted felon. He had also discussed the case with various 
family and friends that had stated their opinion was "let's get it 
over with/1 meaning "Let's kill him [Gardner] on the spot." (R. 
1645) 
9. Mr. Ashment (R. 1647-1665), on the day of the 
courthouse shooting, stated he was across the street and walked over 
to investigate what was happening. While there, an officer had told 
him that Mr. Gardner had escaped and was armed and dangerous. He 
was dismissed for cause. 
10. Mrs. Barker (R. 1712-1721) stated the incident at the 
courthouse was "kind of scary" as she lived in the area. Mrs. 
Barker had also discussed the case with various acquaintances and 
had been subjected to the opinions that what had happened was very 
cruel and that many people had told her she should feel very 
uncomfortable being on the Gardner jury (R. 1719-1720). 
11. Mr. Kelly (R. 1773-1793) stated he thought Gardner's 
lawyers were not contending that he had not committed the crime but 
that perhaps he may have dreamed this as "this thing really is 
affecting all of us." (R. 1773-1774). Mr. Kelly had also discussed 
the incident with the Channel 4 News reporter who was covering the 
incident in the courthouse. Further, Mr. Kelly had discussed the 
case with a friend who felt that the police department should be 
given more time on the shooting range because then Gardner would be 
dead and the case would never have reached trial (R. 1785). 
12. Mrs. Horman (R. 1834-1840) stated the more she thought 
about the case the more she was impressed that Mr. Gardner was 
guilty and that she would have a hard time setting that opinion 
aside (R. 1840). She was excused. 
13. Mrs. Sperry (R. 1840-1849) admitted that as she knew 
some of Mr. Gardner's history she would have a hard time being as 
impartial as she had originally indicated (R. 1847). She stated/1 I 
would like to say, Yes, I could be totally impartial, but I have 
found over the course of the last few days that I don't think I am 
as impartial." (R. 1848). She was excused. 
14. Mrs. Swenson (R. 1858-1865) who during the group voir 
dire stated she had no opinion remembered the incident, stating "I 
saw it on TV two, three times, maybe a dozen times." (R. 1859). She 
also made the statement when asked if she could balance the 
aggravating with the mitigating circumstances that "I would not vote 
for life, just death." (R. 1865). She was excused. 
15. Mrs. Carruthers {R. 1865-1882) who during group voir 
dire stated she had no opinions, stated that she believed of a 
defendant was "already in jail for killing somebody, then this time 
the sentence would be the death sentence." (R. 1874). However, she 
did state she was not sure what the facts of the Gardner case were 
regarding prior convictions. 
16. Mr. Evans (R. 1900-1911) stated his reaction to the 
courthouse shooting was one of abhorrence to the entire 
circumstance. He also stated his initial opinion as "Based on the 
information I had heard, presuming it was true, my opinion is that 
he [Gardner] did attempt to escape and in doing so he did shoot and 
kill an individual and wounded another." (R. 1909). 
17. Mrs. Talbot (R. 1911-1922), when asked what her 
initial opinion was stated, "At the time I probably had a feeling of 
guilt." (R. 1919). 
18. Mr. Baker (R. 1922-1935) said at the onset "I formed 
the opinion that he [Gardner] shot the attorney and the police 
officer." (R. 1931). He had also discussed the incident with 
various acquaintances, and together they agreed that Mr. Gardner 
should receive the death penalty. (R. 1931-1932). Mr. Baker also 
stated, "I haven't put it [his opinion] aside as of yet. I will wait 
and look at the evidence and see what is put forth." (R. 1934). 
19. Mr. Ricks (R. 1373-1379) stated "based on the reports 
and in the media, I felt that he [Gardner] was probably guilty." 
(R. 1376). 
20. Mr. Harwood (R. 1379-1385) stated that his initial 
reaction was that the incident was a horrible thing and that "he 
[Gardner] was guilty." (R 1383). He also believed that Gardner 
would have to bring forward some evidence in order to change his 
mind about that particular view. He was later excused. 
21. Mrs. Jensen-Yates (R. 1385-1393) had discussed the 
case with her sister-in-law and co-workers who were of the opinion 
"they shouldn't even have a trial, they should just shoot him." (R. 
1391). 
22. Mr.Enniss (R. 1398-1405) stated that he was familiar 
with Mr. Gardner's previous criminal record. He had also discussed 
the incident with his colleagues at work. Mr. Enniss also stated 
that at the time of the discussion he probably had an opinion that 
the death penalty was warranted in this case, but that he had not 
brought this up with his colleagues. 
23. Mrs. Davies (R. 1432-1442) had discussed the case with 
a co-employee and stated that she had formed an initial opinion as 
to Mr. Gardner's guilt. (R. 1438-1439). 
24. Mr. Bronson (R. 1442-1452), who stated during group 
voir dire that he had no opinion regarding Gardner's guilt, when 
asked his initial reaction stated he thought, "Boy, he must have 
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